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FORUM

In so doing, the court indulged in
a lengthy review of the statutory
history of MPDA and of the prevailing doctrines which other states
with similar statutes have employed
in enforcing those statutes. While
stressing the importance of protecting the interests of spouses who had
made monetary and nonmonetary
contribution to the marital unit and
residence, the court considered and
rejected two competing theories
adopted by a majority of its sister
jurisdictions: (1) the "inception of
title theory," which grants title to
the spouse who had acquired an equitable right to the property prior to
the marriage, even though not perfected, and (2) the "transmutation
of property theory," which classifies property as marital for the purpose of equitable distribution when
there has been a contribution of
marital funds to nonmarital property. Instead, the court held that
under the MPDA, the appropriate
analysis to be applied is the "source
of funds theory."
Under that theory, when property is acquired by an expenditure of both nonmarital and
marital property, the property
is characterized as part nonmarital and part marital. Thus,
a spouse contributing nonmarital property is entitled to an
interest in the property in the
ratio of the nonmarital investment to the total nonmarital and
marital investment in the property. The remaining property is
characterized as marital property subject to an equitable distribution.
Harper, -- Md. at
929.

-, 448 A.2d at

The court stated that the "source
of funds theory" is consistent with
the language of § 3-6A-01(e), which
sets forth an exclusive list of nonmarital property and indicates a legislative intent that certain property
not be subject to equitable distribution, specifically, property which
is acquired prior to the marriage.

Additionally, to best effectuate the
imposition of its holding, the court
adopted an interpretation of the term
"acquired" appearing in § 3-6A01(e) as:
The on-going process of making payment for property. Tibbets, 406 A.2d at 77. Under this
definition, characterization of
nonmarital or marital property
depends upon the source of
each contribution as payments
are made, rather than at the time
legal or equitable title or possession of the property is obtained.
Id. at

-, 448 A.2d at 929.

Thus, in light of the court's newly
adopted source of funds theory and
interpretation of the term "acquired," it remanded the case to the
trial court so that there might be a
determination as to: (1) the source
of the funds expended for the parcel
of land and the improvements made
thereon by the spouses individually
and as a unit; (2) the degree to which
the parcel of land and the marital
residence are to be characterized as
marital and/or nonmarital; and (3)
the value of the marital property.
The aforementioned factors are all
relevant in the court's determination of an equitable distribution of
the property in issue.
The decision adds some clarification to the MPDA which to this
date remains a statute relatively undefined by case law. It seems to re
affirm that Maryland courts have little or no intention of becoming a
community property jurisdiction, as
evidenced by the Court of Appeals's rejection of the "inception of
title theory" and the "transmutation of property theory."

Recent

Developments in
Maryland's Intestate
Succession Law
The 1982 amendment to Md. Est.
& Trusts Code Ann. § 3-102 (1974),
is a welcome change to Maryland's
intestate succession law. The legislature's purpose for enacting the
amendment was to reflect the intestate's desire to have the greater
portion of the estate go to the surviving spouse.
Under the statute as it existed prior
to 1981, a surviving spouse received
only one third of the deceased's estate if there was a surviving issue.
If there was no surviving issue, but
a surviving parent of the deceased,
then the spouse's share of the estate
increased to one half. And, if there
were no surviving issue or parents,
but a surviving sibling of the deceased, then the spouse's share became one half of the residue of the
estate plus $4,000.00. Thus, the only
way a surviving spouse was entitled
to receive the entire estate was if
there were no surviving issue, parents or siblings of the deceased. Md.
Est. & Trust Code Ann. § 3-102
(1974).
The 1981 amendments to the law
increased the spouse's distribution
of the estate to one half regardless
of whether there was a surviving
issue or parent. Absent a surviving
issue or parent, the spouse received
the entire estate regardless of
whether or not there was a surviving sibling. Md. Est. & Trust Code
Ann. § 3-102 (1981).
The 1982 amendment gives the
surviving spouse an even greater
portion of the estate if the surviving
issue is an adult as opposed to a
surviving minor issue. If the surviving issue is an adult, then the spouse
will be entitled to the first $15,000
of the estate plus one half of the
residue. The same entitlement ap-

plies if there is a surviving parent
of the decedent. But, if there is surviving minor issue, the spouse will
receive only one half of the estate,
the other half of the estate going to
the surviving minor issue. The policy
is to prevent minor issue from possibly becoming wards of the state
by insuring their support. Md. Est.
& Trust Code Ann. § 3-102 (1982).
Proponents of the amendment
were hoping that the legislature
would adopt the Uniform Probate
Code § 2-102 (1969), which gives the
surviving spouse the first $50,000 of
the estate plus one half of the residue, however, the Maryland legislature was not ready for such a
drastic change. The steady progression of this law from 1974 to 1982
indicates that it may not be long
before the Uniform Probate Code
finds its way into Maryland Law.
Louis J. Rosenthal, member of the Governor's
Committee on Intestate Succession and a
member of the adjunct law faculty of the University of Baltimore School of Law supplied
information regarding this recent amendment.

LegislativeNew Incentive
for Secondary
Financing?
by Lisa Dopkin

With housing starts at record lows,
high interest rates, and the Supreme Court's recent ruling upholding the validity of "due-on-sale"
clauses in mortgages by federally
chartered institutions, it seems as if
the American dream of buying a
home is beyond the reach of most.
In order to aid the troubled housing
market in times such as these, it is
often necessary to develop alternative methods of financing.
The Maryland legislature recently
amended Section 8-110 of the Real
Property Article, increasing from 6%
to 12% the allowable capitalization

rate for redemption of certain reversionary estates created by
"ground rent" leases for longer than
15 years. This action provides a much
needed incentive for creating secondary financing.

Historical Background
"Ground rent" leases, while not
generally used in other states, have
been used in Maryland, particularly
in Baltimore City, since the colonial
days. The origin and development
of ground rents in this state have
been extensively reviewed by Judge
Frank A. Kaufman; The Maryland
Ground Rent-Mysterious But Beneficial, 5 Md. L. Rev. 1 (1940) and by
Mayer, Ground Rents in Maryland
(1883).
In the ground rent lease, the
owner of the land in fee simple leases
it for the period of 99 years with a
covenant for renewal from time to
time forever upon payment of a small
renewal fine. The renewal is conditioned on the lessee paying a certain rent (usually payable semi-annually), which, if capitalized at a
reasonable rate of interest, represents what is conceived to be the
value of the land. The lease also
usually provides that if the payment
is in default the lessor may re-enter
and terminate the lease. This system of creating leasehold estates appears to have been based on the
policy of encouraging the lessee to
make improvements. Banks v. Haskie, 45 Md. 207 (1876); Culbreth v.
Smith, 69 Md. 450, 16 A. 112 (1888);
Moran v. Hammersla, 188 Md. 378,
52 A.2d 727 (1947); Kolker v. Biggs,
203 Md. 137, 99 A.2d 743 (1953).
Although the term "ground rent"
primarily relates to the rent payable
to the lessor, it is often used to refer
to the lessor's reversionary interest
in the leasehold premises. Ogle v.
Reynolds, 75 Md. 145, 23 A. 137
(1891).
The interest of the owner of the
reversion has long been held to be
an interest in real property. On the
other hand, the interest of the lessee is a leasehold interest, and has
been uniformly regarded as per-

sonal property, notwithstanding the
fact assignment of the leasehold interest must be executed, acknowledged and recorded as deeds. Myers
v. Silljacks, 58 Md. 319 (1882).
However, "[u]nlike ordinary leases
... the leasehold interest is frequently, not to say usually, by far
the most valuable of the two interests in such perpetual leases ... The
leaseholder is the substantial owner
of the property. All that the owner
of the ground rent is concerned
about is that his rent is secure..."
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v.
Latrobe, 101 Md. 621, 640, 61 A. 203,
209 (1905).
"In practical economic effect, the
relation of the lessee to the property
is that of an owner of land and improvements thereon subject to the
payment of the annual rent and taxes
on the property . . . [t]he technical
relation between the owner of the
rent and of the leasehold is that of
landlord and tenant." Jones v. Magruder, 42 F. Supp. 193, 196 (D. Md.
1941). Furthermore, the owner of the
leasehold under ground rent lease
may assign, sublet or mortgage the
leasehold. Williams v. Safe Deposit &
Trust Co., 167 Md. 499, 175 A. 331
(1934).
For more than a century the leasehold owner could not absolve himself of the necessity of paying the
rent absent an appropriate provision in the lease. However, beginning in 1884, with a series of statutes which were only prospective in
their operation, the legislature provided for the conditions upon which
the ground rents were made redeemable at the option of the leasehold owner. Trustees of Sheppard &
Enoch Pratt Hospital v. Swift & Co.,
178 Md. 200, 13 A.2d 174 (1940).
Redemption transferred the fee to
the leasehold owner thus relieving
him of the obligation to pay rent.
The redemption statutes apply not
only to the usual form of ground
rent leases for 99 years, renewable
forever, but also to all leases of terms
in excess of 15 years. Marburg v.
Mercantile Bldg. Co., 154 Md. 438,
140 A. 836 (1928). But redemption
could not, and to this day cannot,
i

